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Workbook

Data Governance / Security

You own: security-aspect of governance — access control, secret rotation, threat detection, audit integrity, regulatory alignment.

Threat model snapshot

Full table in security.md. Highlights:

  • Compromised runner pod → mitigated by non-root + cap-drop + NetworkPolicy
  • Stolen PAT → scoped + audit per use + rotation
  • Audit tampering → SHA-256 chain detects
  • Cross-tenant data leak → tenant_id everywhere + bucket policy

Daily checks

-- Audit chain integrity (all prod tenants)
SELECT tenant_id, (verify_audit_chain(tenant_id)).*
FROM (SELECT DISTINCT tenant_id FROM genedata_audit_log) t;

-- Anomalous auth failures
SELECT count(*) FROM genedata_audit_log
WHERE action='auth.failure' AND ts >= now() - INTERVAL '1 hour';

Weekly checks

CheckQuery / runbook
New geneflow:admin scoped PATsWHERE 'geneflow:admin' = ANY(scopes) AND created_at >= now() - 7d
Production transitions w/o approvalWHERE approved_by IS NULL AND requested_stage='Production'
Endpoints with requireApproval=falseWHERE drift_check_enabled=false AND status='READY' (suspicious)
Image pulls from non-canonical registriesFalco / Kyverno policy

Monthly checks

  • Access review — see DGL workbook
  • Secret rotation — system tokens, image-pull creds, KMS CMK rotation
  • DR drill from backup
  • Penetration test report review (if external pentest cadence)

Regulatory alignment quick map

StandardGeneFlow control
SOC2Hash-chained audit log + access review queries above
GDPRPer-tenant data residency, audit log shows actor + time, right-to-deletion via tenant teardown
HIPAAPer-tenant KMS CMKs, NetworkPolicy for serving pods, BAA terms in docs/legal/sla.md
FedRAMPPending — TLS 1.3 throughout, FIPS-validated KMS recommended
EU AI ActHash-chained audit log of model + prompt transitions = "post-market monitoring"

Incident playbook

  1. Detect — alert fires (audit chain broken, anomalous transitions, mass auth failures)
  2. Triage — within 15 min: confirm real, scope blast radius, declare severity (see INCIDENT-RESPONSE.md)
  3. Contain — revoke compromised tokens, rotate keys, suspend affected tenants if needed
  4. Investigate — pull genedata_audit_log slice + system logs into a timeline
  5. Recover — restore from clean backup if needed
  6. Postmortem — write within 5 business days using postmortem template
  7. Notify — GDPR 72h, SOC2 customers per SLA

Where to go next