Hardware-Backed Keys
Bring your own KMS — AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, or GCP Cloud KMS — and the root of trust stays in your account. Platform-managed custody uses a per-tenant software KMS.
Bring identity, access controls, encryption, and audit into one security model across your data workflows.
Bring your own KMS — AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, or GCP Cloud KMS — and the root of trust stays in your account. Platform-managed custody uses a per-tenant software KMS.
Private-link ingress, mTLS everywhere, attribute-based authorization at every API. No VPN, no flat network, no implicit trust.
Every action signed and chained — auditors can mathematically verify the audit log has not been altered, even by platform admins.
Zero trust means each layer re-verifies rather than inheriting a decision made upstream. A compromised network position does not yield identity, a valid identity does not yield authorisation, and no combination yields the ability to alter the audit record.
The sequence runs on every request, including internal service-to-service calls and AI inference.
Private-link ingress with mutual TLS. There is no flat internal network where a foothold implies reachability.
Federated SSO issues short-lived, scoped credentials. Long-lived static keys are not part of the model.
Attribute-based authorisation runs per request against the resource, the actor, and the context — not once at session start.
The action is signed and appended to a hash-chained log, so any later alteration is mathematically detectable.
Each of these produces an artefact you can hand to an auditor or a customer's security review.
Bring your own cloud KMS, or use platform-managed custody in a per-tenant software KMS, with revocation under your control.
AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.3 in transit, including between internal services and to inference endpoints.
Each entry signs its predecessor, so tampering is detectable even by an actor with administrative access.
Anomalous query volume, unusual export patterns, and off-hours access raise alerts against a learned baseline.
Privileged operations require approved, time-boxed elevation that expires without manual revocation.
Emergency access is possible, always recorded, and always notifies a second party at the time it is used.
Security work is mostly answering other people's questions with evidence.
Respond to customer due-diligence and regulator questions by querying the platform's own control records rather than restating policy documents.
Assertions backed by queryable evidence.
During an investigation, replay every access by an identity across every layer, with the audit chain proving the record is intact.
Scoping based on record, not inference.
Day-to-day operations run without production data access; privileged actions require time-boxed elevation with a witness.
The blast radius of a compromised operator account shrinks.
Perimeter security assumes the inside is safe. Everything here assumes it is not.
| Dimension | Before Genedata | With Genedata |
|---|---|---|
| Network model | VPN into a trusted internal network | Private link and mTLS, no implicit trust anywhere |
| Credentials | Long-lived keys distributed to services | Short-lived, scoped, federated credentials |
| Authorization | Checked at session start, then assumed | Evaluated per request against live context |
| Audit integrity | A log an administrator could edit | Hash-chained entries where tampering is detectable |
| Evidence | Policy documents and screenshots | A continuous, queryable control record |
Genedata Security gives your CISO continuous, queryable evidence — covering encryption, identity, network, and behavior. When auditors or customers ask 'how do you know?', the answer is a SQL query, not a slide deck.
The questions that appear in every enterprise security review.
You can. Bring your own KMS — AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, or GCP Cloud KMS — or use platform-managed custody in a per-tenant software KMS. Either way revocation is under your control, and revoking a key is an effective kill switch on the data it protects.
Each layer re-verifies rather than inheriting an upstream decision. A network position does not yield identity, a valid identity does not yield authorisation, and no combination yields the ability to alter the audit record.
No, and that is checkable rather than promised. Each entry signs its predecessor, so any alteration breaks the chain and is mathematically detectable — including by an actor with administrative access.
Federated SSO issues short-lived, scoped credentials. Long-lived static keys distributed to services are not part of the model, which removes the most commonly exploited credential class.
Break-glass access exists, is always recorded, and always notifies a second party at the time it is used. Privileged operations otherwise require approved, time-boxed elevation that expires without manual revocation.
Threat model, control catalog, and key management architecture.
RunbookPlaybooks for containment, scoping, and evidence preservation.
ComplianceControls mapped to SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, and GDPR.
StatusLive health and incident history across every region.
Work through your questionnaire with our security team, or start with the whitepaper and control catalog.